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NO. 343 报告人:屈展

——Vertical Contracts and the Bullwhip Effect:Model, Extensions and Possible Applications to Trade

编辑:admin 时间:2020年10月30日 访问次数:4382

 

题目:Vertical Contracts and the Bullwhip Effect:
     Model, Extensions and Possible Applications to Trade 

报告人:屈展  助理教授  德国哥廷根大学 

主持人:叶兵   副教授   浙江大学经济学院 

时间:2020年10月30日(星期五) 下午14:00-15:30

 

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摘要:This paper shows that allowing downstream firms in a supply chain to carry strategic inventory may dampen the bullwhip effect, thereby making the supply chain more resilient to demand shocks. Strategic inventory occurs if downstream firms move orders forward in order to put pressure on the wholesale prices that suppliers charge on subsequent purchases. We show that it is the process of forward buying that reduces the variance of suppliers' production relative to buyers' sales. Since strategic inventory involves an implicit cost there is a limit to how much strategic inventory buyers should be allowed to carry and hence how much the bullwhip effect should be dampened. We prove that suppliers should only eliminate the bullwhip effect if demand shocks are not too persistent. 

 

简历:屈展,德国哥廷根大学助理教授。博士毕业于德国基尔大学,曾在TU Dresden从事博士后研究工作。研究兴趣主要包括运营管理、国际贸易、以及产业组织。研究工作曾发表于Management Science, Economic Theory,International Journal of Industrial Organization等国际学术杂志。

 

 

 

CRPE秘书处
2020-10-26