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NO. 358 报告人:王博

Name as Incentive: Political Accountability without Re-election

编辑:张亚楠时间:2021-10-18访问次数:38

题目:   Name as Incentive: Political Accountability without Re-election

报告人:王   博  助理教授    浙江工商大学国际商学院

主持人:叶   兵  副教授       浙江大学民营经济研究中心

时间:   2021年10月22日(星期五) 下午1:00 -2:30

地点:   腾讯会议(会议 ID:597 177 763; 本次会议对外开放,请加入会议者将个人姓名备注为 真实姓名+单位)

摘要:   We introduce a name market into an overlapping generations model to address politician selection and political accountability when office-holders need not stand for re-election. We show that the name market could mitigate both issues. On the one hand, acquiring a good name screens good politicians; on the other hand, earning a good name incentivizes old politicians. The political accountability problem is solvable because of the selection problem. Transparency of a politician's type crowds out the name, aggravating the political accountability problem. We finally derive the optimal information policy and discuss its economic implications.

简介:王博,浙江工商大学国际商学院助理教授;2019年博士毕业于香港科技大学,本科硕士均毕业于浙江大学经济学院。研究方向主要包括名字泡沫与全局博弈。有多篇文章发表于Economic Letters等学术期刊。




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2021-10-18